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SOUTH AFRICA’S DILEMMA: IMMUNITY LAWS, 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, AND THE VISIT BY 




 Abstract:  President Al Bashir has avoided the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) for seven years and has been able to travel to both states that are party 
to the Rome Statute and states that are not without any consequences.  The existence 
of customary international law immunities makes it difficult for the ICC to be able to 
discharge its duties without the cooperation of states parties.  The silence of the 
Security Council and its failure to clarify Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) on 
whether the resolution indeed removes Sudan’s immunities in order for President Al 
Bashir to be arrested and surrendered to the ICC equally makes the ICC’s job 
difficult.  This article examines whether there is a justification for South Africa’s 
failure to abide by its obligations under the Rome Statute when it did not secure and 
arrest President Al Bashir.  This will be done against the backdrop of the ICC 
decisions on the obligations of states parties to the Rome Statute to cooperate.  The 
article also analyzes the South African High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgments with regard to South Africa’s domestic and international obligations.  
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 In January 2015, the South African government agreed to host the 
African Union Summit to be held in June of the same year.
1
  This meant 
the Heads of State and other senior government officials would attend 
this Summit.  Amongst those who would attend was Sudan’s President 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, who is wanted by the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”).
2
  He is alleged to have committed international 
crimes which include five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, 
extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape); two counts of war 
crimes (intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population or 
against individual civilians not taking part in the hostilities and pillaging); 
                                                          

  LL.B, LL.M (Western Cape), SJD (Wisconsin-Madison), Associate Professor of International 
Law, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. A draft version of 
this article was presented at 1st Law and Society in Africa Conference, Dynamism, Liminality, Reality? 
Policy, Research and the Law in an Afropolitan Era, Cape Town, South Africa, co-hosted by the 
Centre for Law and Society, University of Cape Town and Law and Society Association, Dec. 2016; 
and at the Law and Society Annual Meeting, at the Delta: Belonging, Place and Visions of Law and 
Social Change, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, May 2016. I would like to thank the Wits Programme 
in Law, Justice & Development for funding to attend the Annual Meeting in New Orleans, and the 
organizers of the 1st Law and Society in Africa to attend and present in Cape Town. I am grateful to 
the editors of this journal for guidance and to Mtende Mhango for being a sounding board for my 
ideas. All errors are mine. 
1
  Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 
(5) SA 1 (GP) (S. Afr.). 
2
  The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09; The Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Warrant of Arrest, (Mar. 4, 2009); The Prosecutor v. 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-95, Second Warrant of Arrest, (July 12, 2010). See 
also The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Judgment on Appeal, 
(Feb. 3, 2010). 
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and three counts of genocide (genocide by killing, genocide by causing 
serious bodily or mental harm, and genocide by deliberately inflicting on 




 Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, which established the 
ICC.
4
  Ordinarily, the ICC is expected to investigate and prosecute 
persons for matters that come from states that have ratified the Rome 
Statute (“states parties”) as rules of international law so require.
5
  
However, states parties to the Rome Statute included a provision which 
gives the United Nations (“UN”) Security Council the power to refer a 
situation that threatens international peace and security to the ICC for 
investigation and possible prosecution.
6
  This provision serves as a 
jurisdictional trigger mechanism for the ICC to investigate and prosecute 
nationals of a non-party state to the Rome Statute.
7
  This means that 
situations originating from non-party states to the Rome Statute may be 





 In the case of Sudan, the Security Council 
referred the Darfur situation to the ICC Prosecutor
10
 based on the 
recommendation of the International Commission on Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Darfur.
11
  The 
                                                          
3
  Id.  
4
  The Rome Statute was adopted by delegates from around the world at UN conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on Establishment of the ICC, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998. See generally, 
Phillipe Q.C. Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference, in THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta 
& John RWD Jones eds., 2002). 
5
  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with annex) art. 34, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
6
  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (Rome, 17 July 1998) UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Art. 13 of 
the Rome Statute reads as follows: 
 ‘The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:  
(a) A situation in which one or more crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations; or 
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance 
with article 15.’ 
7
  On different trigger mechanisms for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction, see Mahnoush H. 
Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 26-29 (1999). 
8
  Situation in Darfur, Sudan ICC-02/05 (June 2005). See also The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09. 
9
  Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11 (March 2011). See also The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11. 
10
  See S.C. Res. 1593, para. 1 (March 31, 2005). 
11
  This Commission was established by the UN Secretary-General on the request by the Security 
Council that the Secretary-General ‘rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order 
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International Commission of Inquiry established that the government 
forces of Sudan and the militias committed widespread acts which could 
amount to crimes against humanity.  These acts included rape and other 
forms of sexual violence, destruction of villages, torture, killings of 
civilians, and forced pillages.
12
  Based on this report by the International 
Commission of Inquiry, the Security Council determined that there was a 
continuous threat to international peace and security in Darfur. These 
findings caused the Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC 




 The ICC Prosecutor investigated the Darfur situation to determine 
whether there was a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation.
14
   
Once the Prosecutor was satisfied that there was a reasonable basis to 
proceed with the investigation, an application was made to the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber
15
 to issue a warrant for President Al Bashir’s arrest.
16
  
After examining the material brought by the Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber was satisfied that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to 
identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held 
accountable’. See S.C. Res. 1564, para. 12 (Sep. 18, 2004). See also Rep. of Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the UN Secretary-General, at 5, U.N. Doc (Sep. 18, 2004) (recommending that the Security 
Council refers the Darfur situation to the ICC as per article 13(b) of the Rome Statute as ‘the alleged 
crimes that have been documented in Darfur [met] the thresholds of the Rome Statute). The Report of 
the Commission is available at <www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf> [hereinafter Rep. of 
Int'l Comm'n on Darfur]. 
12
  See Rep. of Int'l Comm'n on Darfur at 3. 
13
  See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 10 pmbl.The Security Council has the primary responsibility 
to deal with issues that threaten international peace and security. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (stating that 
"[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken … to 
maintain or restore international peace and security"). 
14
  See Rome Statute, supra note 6 at art. 53.  See also The Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper 
on Preliminary Examinations, para. 5 (Nov. 2013) (describing the relevant Rome Statute 
principles, factors and procedures applied by the Office in the conduct of its 
preliminary examination activities’) https://www.icccpi.int/items Documents/OTP%20Preliminary%20
Examinations/OTP%20%20Policy%20Paper%20Preliminary%20Examinations%20%202013.pdf. 
15
  Art. 34(b) of the Rome Statute, supra note 6 stipulates that the ICC consists of three judicial 
divisions: the Pre-Trial Division or Chambers; the Trial Division; and the Appeals Division. On the 
number of judges per chambers, see art. 39 of the Rome Statute. The role of the Pre-Trial Chamber is 
to deal with preliminary issues such as deciding whether or not there is sufficient evidence to go on 
trial and to confirm charges and to also issue summons or arrest warrants. See Rome Statute, arts. 56 - 
61. 
16
  See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF [hereinafter Decision on Prosecution's Application]. See 
also Rome Statute, supra note 6 at art. 58(1) which, in part, states that "[a]t any time after the initiation 
of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant 
of arrest of a person, if having examined the application and the evidence or other information 
submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that (a) [t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court." 
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Omar Al Bashir is criminally responsible . . . as an indirect perpetrator or 
as an indirect co-perpetrator for those war crimes and crimes against 
humanity for which the Chamber has already found in the present 
decision that there are reasonable grounds to believe that they were 
directly committed.”
17
  The Pre-Trial Chamber subsequently issued the 
arrest warrant against President Al Bashir.
18
  The Pre-Trial Chamber also 
requested the states parties and non-party states cooperate with the ICC 
by arresting and surrendering President Al Bashir to the ICC if he was  
apprehended in their respective territories.
19
 
Upon learning that President Al Bashir was in South Africa, the 
Southern African Litigation Centre
20
 approached the High Court of South 
Africa
21
 to ensure that the South African government would abide by its 
                                                          
17
  Decision on Prosecution's Application, at para. 223. See also Id. at para. 28, where the Pre-
Trial Chamber outlines the questions to be satisfied by the Prosecutor before the application for the 
issue of an arrest warrant is granted. 
18
  The first arrest warrant against President Al Bashir was issued on March 4, 2009 (ICC, 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, March 4, 2009) and the 
second arrest warrant (ICC, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-
95, July 12, 2010) was issued on July 12, 2010 after the Prosecutor successfully appealed to the 
Appeals Chamber to include the charge of genocide when the initial arrest warrant did not include it. 
See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-21, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (June 24, 2009). See also Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-94, Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest (July 12, 2010) (where the Pre-Trial Chamber included the charge of genocide) [hereinafter 
Second Decision]. 
19
  See Second Decision, where the Pre-Trial Chamber instructed the ICC Registry to ‘prepare a 
request for cooperation seeking the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir for the counts contained in 
both the first and the second warrant of arrest’. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 6 at art. 87 on 
requests for cooperation. 
20
  A National Governmental Organization "which promotes and advances human rights and the 
rule of law in southern Africa primarily through strategic litigation support and capacity building." 
SOUTHERN AFRICA LITIGATION CENTRE, www.southernafricanlitigationcentre.org/about/ (last visited 
Aug. 2016).  
21
  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 166 provides for the hierarchy of the South African courts as follows: 
The courts are—  
(a)  the Constitutional Court;  
(b)  the Supreme Court of Appeal;  
(c) the High Court of South Africa, and any high court of appeal that may be  
established by an Act of Parliament to hear appeals from any court of a status  
similar to the High Court of South Africa;  
(d) the Magistrates’ Courts; and  
(e) any other court established or recognized in terms of an Act of Parliament,  
including any court of a status similar to either the High Court of South Africa  
or the Magistrates’ Courts.  
The Constitutional Court is the highest court in South Africa and may sit as a court of first 
instance or last instance on constitutional matters and any matter that is of public interest. The 
Constitutional Court also has exclusive jurisdiction in certain matters such as determining the 
constitutionality of the conduct of the president of South Africa. See § 167. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal decides on appeals from the high courts and may deal deal with issues connected with appeals 
as determined by legislation. See § 168. The high court may deal with constitutional issues except 
those that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, or which the Constitutional 
Court has decided to hear as the court of first instance. See § 169. 
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international obligations, and arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to 
the ICC.
22
 Meanwhile on the request of the ICC Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber also clarified South Africa’s position with regard to its 
obligations under the Rome Statute.
23
  It is important to note that once  
the ICC issued the arrest warrant, the African Union (“AU”) adopted a 
series of resolutions instructing member states not to comply with the 
ICC’s request that the states parties cooperate by arresting and 
surrendering President Al Bashir to the ICC.
24
  The Pre-Trial Chamber 
held that there was no dilemma for South Africa as it is a state party to 
the Rome Statute, and must therefore abide by the Statute’s obligations. 
In addition, the Sudanese situation was referred to by the Security 
Council Resolution 1593, which is binding upon all states.
25
 While the 
South African government tried to delay the proceedings by asking for 
more time, the High Court made an order that President Al Bashir not be 
allowed to leave South Africa.
26
  
 It is well-known that President Al Bashir was able to leave South 
Africa’s territory before the judgment was handed down by the High 
Court, which required South Africa to arrest and surrender President Al 
Bashir to the ICC.
27
  The government of South Africa appealed the 
judgment of the High Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”).
28
 
The SCA dismissed the appeal and held that South Africa failed to act 
consistently with its obligations to arrest and surrender President Al 
Bashir to the ICC at both the international and domestic levels.
29
 The 
                                                          
22
  Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 
(5) SA 1 (GP) para. 2. 
23
  The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-242, (June 13, 2015). 
Decision following the Prosecutor’s request for an order further clarifying that the Republic of South 
Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir. 
24
  See AU Assembly, Decision on the ICC, para. 3 Assembly/AU/Dec. 590 (XXVI), (Jan. 30-31 
2016), Addis Ababa, (commending South Africa ‘for complying with the Decisions of the Assembly 
on non-cooperation with the arrest and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir of The Sudan and 
Decides that by receiving President Al Bashir, [South Africa] was implementing various AU Assembly 
Decisions on the warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against President Bashir and that South Africa 
was consistent with its obligations under international law.’) 
25
  Id. at para. 5. 
26
  See also SALC v Minister of Justice, at para. 36. 
27
  See Norimitsu Onishi, Omar al-Bashir, Leaving South Africa, Eludes Arrest Again, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2015,  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/omar-hassan-al-bashir-
sudan-south-africa.html?_r=0; Tara Penny, Barry Bateman & Jean-Jacques Cornish, Omar Al-Bashir 
Defies Court Order and Leaves South Africa, EYE WITNESS NEWS, June 15, 2015, 
http://ewn.co.za/2015/06/15/Omar-alBashir-to-land-in-Sudan-this-evening; Don Melvin & Elliot C. 
McLaughlin, Sudan's Leader Leaves South Africa Before Court Orders Arrest, CNN, June 
15, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/15/africa /south-africa-summit-icc-omar-al-bashir-arrest/. 
28
  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. Southern African Litigation Centre 
2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
29
  Id. at para. 107 and 113, where the SCA altered the High Court Order as follows: ‘The 
Conduct of the Respondents in failing to take steps to arrest and surrender to the [ICC], the President 
of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, after his arrival in South Africa on 13 June 2015 to attend 
the 25th Assembly of the African Union, was inconsistent with South Africa’s obligations in terms of 
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government of South Africa appealed the SCA judgment to the 
Constitutional Court,
30
 but later withdrew the appeal after the 
government’s decision to exit the Rome Statute.
31
 One reason advanced 
by the South African government for the exit is that “South Africa found 
itself in the unenviable position where it was faced with conflicting 
obligations: obligations contained in the Rome Statute which are in 
conflict with customary international law pertaining to immunity for 
sitting Heads of State.”
32
  Therefore, being a state party to the Rome 
Statute compromised South Africa’s “efforts to promote peace and 
security on the African Continent and to play an essential part in 
international peacekeeping missions in Africa and in related peace 
processes.”
33
  Subsequent to the decision to exit the Rome Statute, the 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services introduced the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act Repeal Bill to South Africa’s Parliament in late 2016.
34
  However, in 
March 2017, a notice to withdraw the repeal Bill was tendered before 
South Africa’s Parliament by the Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services without any explanation.
35
  South Africa has been a state party to 
the Rome Statute since November 27, 2000.
36
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the Rome Statute … and section 10 of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the [ICC] Act 27 of 
2002, and unlawful’. 
30
  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. Southern Litigation Centre (3) S.A. 
317 (SCA). 
31
 Michelle Nichols, SA Begins Process to Withdraw From International Criminal Court, MAIL & 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 21 2016, http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-21-south-africa-begins-process-to-withdraw-
from-the-icc (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). It is worth noting that the High Court of South Africa has 
recently found that the executive branch of government of South Africa acted unconstitutional in 
giving the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute without first getting approval from the 
legislative branch of government for such approval. The high court found that the executive breached 
the separation of powers for usurping the legislative powers in this regard. The executive branch was 
then ordered to rescind the notice of withdrawal until the legislative process has been completed on 
whether or not to withdraw from the Rome Statute. This judgment did not deal with the substantive 
nature of the withdrawal, but dealt with the procedural aspect that the executive did not have the power 
to withdraw from the Rome Statute without approval from the legislative branch. See Democratic 
Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and others (Council for the 
Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening) 2017 (3) SA 212 (G.P). For analysis of 
this judgment, see Hannah Woolaver, Unconstitutional and Invalid: South Africa’s Withdrawal from 
the ICC Barred (For Now), EJIL Talk (Feb. 27, 2017), www.ejiltalk.org/unconstitutional-and-invalid-
south-africas-withdrawal-from-the-icc-barred-for-now/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
32
 See Opening Statement from T. M. Masutha, Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, 
Fifteenth Meeting of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, The Hague, 
Nov. 16-24, 2016, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/GenDeba/ICC-ASP15-GenDeba-
SouthAfrica-ENG.pdf (last visited on Apr. 2017) (unnumbered). 
33
 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (S. Afr.), South Africa's Withdrawal 
from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
http://www.dirco.gov.za/milan_italy/newsandevents/rome_statute.pdf (undated). 
34
 See Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill, 
B23 of 2016. 
35
 See Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Announcements, Tablings and Committee 
Reports, Fourth Session, Fifth Parliament, No. 33-2017, announcing that the Minister of Justice and 
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President Al Bashir’s visit to South Africa to attend the African 
Union Summit necessitates an examination of South Africa’s immunity 
laws and obligations both domestically and internationally.  South Africa 
has enacted at least three statutes that address immunities of Heads of 
State and other senior state officials.
37
  South Africa plays an important 
role in the African region and it is known as one of the most influential 
member states of the AU.
38
  This is not surprising since the AU was a 
brainchild of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, 
and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki.
39
  It is therefore befitting to discuss the 
position of the AU with regard to the ICC’s arrest warrant issued against 
President Al Bashir.  
I have previously analyzed the strained relationship between the 
ICC and the African states.
40
  In the first paper I discussed whether the 
ICC was targeting Africa in the aftermath of arrest warrants issued by the 
ICC against two sitting presidents at the time: Al Bashir and Libya’s 
Gaddafi.
41
  I observed that one could conclude that the ICC cannot be 
viewed as targeting Africa because “African states [] voluntarily ratified 
the Rome Statute and therefore the consequences that flow from such 
ratification are that the ICC will prosecute Africans if African states are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Correctional Services withdrew the Bill in accordance with the Rules of the National Assembly, 
https:www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/atc/ed163e45-eccd-4b9e-8d11-
817d5c9820e3.pdf (last visited on Apr. 2017). See also, Siyabonga Mkhwanazi, SA will not withdraw 
from ICC –Justice Minister, IOL, March 15, 2017, http:www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sa-will-not-
withdraw-from-icc---justice-minister-8194669 (last visited on Apr. 2017). 
36
 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statu
te.aspx (last visited on Sep. 26, 2016). 
37
 Foreign Immunities Act 87 of 1981; Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001; and 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC Act 27 of 2002. [hereinafter ICC Implementation Act]. 
38
 See Jackie Cilliers, Julia Schünemann & Jonathan Moyer, Power and influence in Africa: 
Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES 14 (March 
2015). 
39
 See Tiyanjana Maluwa, From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union: 
Rethinking the Framework for Inter-State Cooperation in Africa in the Era of Globalisation, 5 U. OF 
BOTS. L. J. 15, fn 44 (2007) (observing that ‘Both Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo 
Mbeki of South Africa, as well as Foreign Minister Amr Mousa of Egypt, standing in for President 
Hosni Mubarak, played critical roles in the debates and consultations which produced the compromise 
that formed the basis for the Sirte Declaration. Their respective support for the proposed Constitutive 
Act of the African Union in the Lome summit was equally critical to securing its adoption after initial 
expressions of reservations by a number of delegations both at the ministerial and summit levels. 
However, Ghaddafi's self-image as "the leader of Africa" cannot be ignored. Any recent visitor to 
Tripoli will testify to the adornment of various major points and buildings in the city with murals and 
slogans displaying or proclaiming Ghaddafi's various poses and roles as the "leader," "guide" or 
"liberator" of the African continent and its people’). 
40
  See Ntombizozuko Dyani, Is the International Criminal Court Targeting Africa? Reflections 
on the Enforcement of International Criminal Law in Africa in AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 185-220 (Vincent Nmehielle ed., 2012); and Ntombizozuko 
Dyani-Mhango, The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on Malawi regarding the failure to arrest and 
surrender President Al Bashir of Sudan: An opportunity missed, 28 S. AFR. PUB. L. 106-120 (2013). 
41
  Dyani, supra note 40; see also S.C. Res. 1970, para. 4-8 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
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unwilling and unable to prosecute.”
42
  I will also remind readers that the 
conflict between the ICC and the AU (as the collective of the African 
states) only arose once the ICC issued arrest warrants against the sitting 
Heads of State.  Situations such as those in Uganda,
43
 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (“DRC”),
44
 and in the Central African Republic
45
 
were self-referrals by the respective states.
46
  However, I also argue that 
Africa being the only continent where heinous crimes are committed is a 
legitimate question, as at the time the Prosecutor was only investigating 
situations in Africa.
47
  Since then, the Prosecutor has been investigating 
Georgia for crimes against humanity and war crimes,
48
 additionally 
several other non-African countries are under preliminary examination.
49
  
I conclude in that paper that if African states wish to avoid being targeted 
by the ICC, they need to strengthen their judicial systems to align with 
international standards to try perpetrators domestically because the ICC 
operates only on a complementarity basis.
50
  Put differently, the ICC may 
only claim jurisdiction if the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute an 
alleged perpetrator for international crimes found in the Rome Statute.
51
 
In the second paper, I scrutinized the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision 
on Malawi for failing to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir while he 
attended the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(“COMESA”) Summit.
52
  I criticized the Pre-Trial Chamber for failing to 
                                                          
42
  Dyani, supra note 40, at 218. 
43
  Press Release, International Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, (Jan. 29, 2004). 
44
  Press Release, International Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, (Apr. 19, 2004). 
45
  Press Release, International Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central 
African Republic, (Jan. 7,  2005). 
46
 See Dyani, supra note 40, at 186 and the accompanying footnotes. 
47
 Id. at 219. 
48
  See Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Authorises the 
Prosecutor to Open an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia, (Jan. 27, 2016); Situation in 
Georgia, Case No. ICC-01/15/12, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an 
investigation, (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_00608.PDF. 
49
  These include Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq/UK, Palestine, Registered Vessels of Comoros, 
Greece and Cambodia and Ukraine. This information can be easily accessed from the 
ICC website. Academics, Students and the ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/get-involved/pages/academics-
and-researchers.aspx 
50
  Dyani, supra note 40, at 220. For the discussion of the complementarity principle, see 
VINCENT O. NMEHIELLE, Taking Credible Ownership of Justice for Atrocity Crimes in Africa: The 
African Union and the Complementarity Principle of the Rome Statute, in AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 223 (2012); and Carol Nalule & Rachel Odoi-Musoke, The 
Complementarity Principle Put to the Test: Uganda’s Experience, in AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 243 (Vincent O. Nmehielle ed., 2012).   
51
  See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art 1 (read together with the Preamble to the Rome Statute 
para.  10 and art 17 on the admissibility of the cases to the ICC) which provides that the ICC "shall 
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, …and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." 
52
  Dyani-Mhango, supra note 40, at 109. See also The Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-
01/09-139-Corr, Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the 
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 of the 
Rome Statute.
55
  The conflict arises from article 27(2) prohibiting any 
form of immunity barring the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over 
the individual claiming immunity, while article 98(1) prohibits the ICC 
from forcing a state party to the Rome Statute to cooperate by arresting 
and surrendering a person from a third state
56
 if such cooperation will 
result in the state party acting against its customary international law 
obligations owed to the third state.
57
  The Pre-Trial Chamber failed to 
deal with the conflict between these two articles as it held that article 
98(1) of the Rome Statute did not apply to the matter.
58
  I also argued that 
Malawi was justified in not arresting and surrendering President Al 
Bashir to the ICC because of its other obligations under customary 
international law owed to Sudan, a non-party state to the Rome Statute.
59
  
Since then, the Pre-Trial Chamber has dealt with the conflict between 
articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute.
60
  
 In this paper I ask: Is there a justification for South Africa’s failure 
to abide by its obligations under the Rome Statute when it did not secure 
and arrest President Al Bashir?  In other words, does the same argument 
for Malawi apply to the South African situation?  This paper will revisit 
these arguments and examine whether they apply to the South African 
situation.  The paper will also analyze the High Court and the SCA 
judgments on South Africa’s domestic and international obligations.  This 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with 
Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Dec. 13, 
2011), https://www.iccc-pi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_21750.PDF [hereinafter Malawi Decision].  
53
  Rome Statute, supra note 6 art. 27(2) states that "[i]mmunities or special procedural rules 
which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall 
not bar the [ICC] from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person." 
54
  Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(1) states, "[the ICC] may not proceed with a request for 
surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the [ICC] can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the 
waiver of the immunity." 
55
  Dyani-Mhango, supra note 40, at 108. 
56
  Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(g) defines a third state as ‘a state not party to the 
treaty.’ I use non-party state and third state interchangeably. 
57
  Id. at 116-119. For further reading on this issue, see also Paola Gaeta, Does President Al 
Bashir Enjoy Immunity From Arrest? 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 315 (2009); Dapo Akande, The Legal 
Nature of the Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunities, 7 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333 (2009). 
58
  Malawi Decision, supra note 52, at para. 43. 
59
  Dyani-Mhango, supra note 40, at 116-119. 
60
  See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, Decision on the Cooperation of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the 
Court, paras. 28–31 (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_03452.PDF 
[hereinafter DRC Decision] (holding that the Security Council Resolution to refer the matter to the 
ICC implicitly waived any form of immunities that President Al Bashir may have under customary 
international law). 
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will be done against the backdrop of the ICC decisions on the obligations 
of states parties to the Rome Statute to cooperate with the ICC.  
Part I of the article presents a brief background to the events that 
led to South Africa’s dilemma caused by its failure to abide by its 
obligations under the Rome Statute by virtue of being both a member of 
the AU and a state party to the Rome Statute.  Part II briefly discusses the 
status of personal immunities entitled to Heads of State under customary 
international law, while Part III discusses the Rome Statute on 
immunities entitled to Heads of State from non-party states.  Part III also 
discusses the criticism levelled against the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers I and 
II decisions on the conflict between articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome 
Statute.  Part IV then analyzes South Africa’s legal framework on 
personal immunities and the South African courts’ decisions on South 
Africa’s failure to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to the ICC.  
Part IV also examines the consequences of South Africa’s attempt to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute and concludes that despite such an 
attempt to withdraw, South Africa would still face the consequences of 
failing to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to the ICC under the 
Rome Statute.  
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON HEADS OF STATE AND PERSONAL 
IMMUNITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
 As explained above, the tension between the AU and the ICC 
stems from the barring of immunities for sitting Heads of State such as 
President Al Bashir, and is further exacerbated because Sudan is not party 
to the Rome Statute.  This necessitates a brief discussion of immunities 
entitled to sitting Heads of State.  Heads of State or government and 
foreign ministers (state officials) enjoy the broadest scope of immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction of foreign states in general.  The rationale 
behind the exemption from criminal jurisdiction is two-fold: first, Head 
of State immunity is premised on the concept that a state and its rulers are 
one for the purposes of immunity; and second, all states are equal with 
the consequence that no state may exercise judicial authority over 
another.
61
  There is much literature about immunities in international law, 
specifically, the distinction between diplomatic and sovereign 
immunities, and between functional (ratione materiae)
62
 and personal 
(ratione personae) immunities.
63
  Of concern in this discussion is the 
                                                          
61
  ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (2001). 
62
  Functional immunity is grounded on the notion that a state official is not accountable to other 
states for acts that he accomplished in his official capacity, so such acts must therefore be attributed to 
the state. See id. 
63
   See generally, YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2004). 
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personal immunities accorded to Heads of State under sovereign 
immunities.   
 According to personal immunity, a senior state official is immune 
from foreign state jurisdiction in order to guard against the violation of 
state sovereignty or an interference with the official functions of a state 
agent under the pretext of dealing with an exclusively private act.
64
  
Indeed, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in Arrest Warrant 
Case,
65
 confirmed this notion: 
[T]he functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, 
throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when 
abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability. That immunity and inviolability protect the 
individual concerned against any act of authority of another 




After carefully examining state practice, the ICJ further confirmed that it 
was “unable to deduce from this state practice that there exists under 
customary international law any form of exception to the rule according 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having 
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.”
67
  This illustrates 
how personal immunity is an absolute prohibition of the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction by foreign states. “Judicial opinion and state practice 
on this point are unanimous and no case can be found in which it was 
held that a state official possessing personal immunity is subject to the 
criminal jurisdiction of a foreign state where it is alleged that he or she 
has committed an international crime.”
68
  
 The ICJ confirmed that this immunity extends even in cases 
involving allegations of international crimes.
69
  However, the Arrest 
Warrant Case also made it clear that personal immunities may be lifted in 
international courts such as the ICC.
70
  Indeed, article 27(2) of the Rome 
                                                          
64
  CASSESE, supra note 61, at 862. 
65
  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep 3. 
(Feb. 14) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case]. 
66
  Id. at paras. 54-55. 
67
  Id. at para. 58. 
68
  Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 407, 411 (2004). 
69
  Id. 
70
  Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 65, at para. 61 (where in its dictum, the ICJ stated that 
immunity might be lifted in four instances such as when the accused is tried in their home state; if the 
546 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.   26 NO.   3 
 
Statute states that personal immunities do not bar the ICC from exercising 
its jurisdiction irrespective of the status of the person accused of 
committing an international crime.
71
  It is also worth noting that the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) has embarked on a study of 
immunities for incumbent or foreign Heads of State and senior 
government officials which includes looking at personal immunities, 
amongst other related issues.
72
  The ILC Special Rapporteur has reported 
that personal immunities for sitting senior state officials in domestic 
courts are widely recognized and that no evidence exists that state 
practice leads to exceptions.
73
  The ILC Special Rapporteur also stated 
that if there are exceptions to personal immunities they must satisfy the 




 As discussed above, the current international law position is that 
while President Al Bashir may be entitled to personal immunities before 
domestic courts, no such entitlement exists before international courts.  
The question that remains is whether he is entitled to immunities before 
the South African courts for the purposes of South Africa’s obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC by arresting and surrendering him to the ICC.  
This question becomes more important since Sudan is not party to the 
Rome Statute. 
III. THE ROME STATUTE ON IMMUNITIES AND NON-PARTY STATES TO 
THE ROME STATUTE 
As explained above, article 27(2) abrogates the immunities of  
persons accused of having perpetrated international crimes before the 
ICC irrespective of their status, while article 98(1) prohibits the ICC from 
requesting states parties to surrender or assist if such assistance would 
require the requested state to breach its customary international law 
                                                                                                                                                                      
home state waives immunity; if the accused no longer holds office; and when the accused stands trial 
before certain international courts). 
71
  Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 27(2) states that ‘Immunities or special procedural rules 
which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall 
not bar the [ICC] from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person’. 
72
  See Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Fifth Report. on Immunity of State 
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/701 (June 14, 2016) [hereinafter ILC 
Fifth Report.]. 
73
  Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur), Second Report. on Immunity of State 
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (June 10, 2010) 
[hereinafter ILC Second Report.] (reissued for technical reasons on Feb. 22, 2011); see also, ILC Fifth 
Report. supra note 72, at para. 196. 
74
  Id. para. 54. 
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obligations owed to a third state.
75
  Cooperation by states parties to arrest 
and surrender persons from a third state
76
 is allowed only when the ICC 
secures cooperation of the third state for the waiver of immunities.
77
  
Further, as with any other treaty, the Rome Statute binds those states who 
have subscribed to it.
78
  Third states are therefore not bound by the Rome 
Statute when it comes to cooperation with the ICC.  However, article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute gives jurisdiction to the ICC to prosecute 
perpetrators from third states by virtue of a referral from the UN Security 
Council, as was the case for Sudan’s President Al Bashir.
79
  The question 
is whether states parties to the Rome Statute are obliged to arrest 
President Al Bashir who is a sitting head of a third state.  This is where 
the apparent conflict between articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome 
Statute becomes relevant.  
A. Two Schools of Thought Resolving the Conflict Between 
Articles 27(2) and 98(1) 
There are two schools of thought on the apparent conflict. One 
view, to which I subscribe, is that article 98(1) means that a state party to 
the Rome Statute may not be forced to cooperate with the ICC request to 
arrest and surrender an accused from a third state if such cooperation will 
breach the customary international law obligations the state party owes to 
the third state.
80
  The argument is that once the Security Council refers 
the matter to the ICC for investigation, the Rome Statute applies.  This 
means that the proceedings of the referral will be conducted in 
accordance with the Rome Statute, the ICC Rules of Procedure, and the 
Elements of Crime.
81
  However, this does not make Sudan a party to the 
Rome Statute.  In fact, “a referral by the Security Council is simply a 
mechanism envisaged in the Statute to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC: 
it does not and cannot turn a non-party to the Statute into a state party, 
and it has not turned Sudan into a state party to the Statute.”
82
  In order 
for states parties to be able to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir, 
the ICC will still need to obtain a waiver of personal immunities entitled 
                                                          
75
  Paola Gaeta, Official Capacity and Immunities, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 990 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John Jones 
eds., 2002). 
76
  Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(h) (defines a third state as “a state not party to the 
treaty”). 
77
  DRC Decision, supra note 60, para. 22. 
78
  Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 34 (states that a “treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third state without its consent”). 
79
  See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 10. 
80
  Gaeta, supra note 57. 
81
  Id. at 324. 
82
  Id. 
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to President Al Bashir from Sudan—a third state.
83
   According to this 
view, the tension between articles 27 and 98 will only be resolved by the 
ICC securing the waiver from Sudan.  There is no evidence which 
suggests that the ICC has secured a waiver of personal immunities 
entitled to President Al Bashir from Sudan.  
The alternative view is that because the ICC is prosecuting an 
accused from a third state by virtue of a Security Council referral, this 
means that the referral by the Security Council is binding upon Sudan, 
which abrogates President Al Bashir’s personal immunities.
84
 According 
to this view, “[t]he fact Sudan is bound by article 25 of the UN Charter 
and implicitly by Security Council Resolution 1593 to accept the 
decisions of the ICC puts Sudan in an analogous position to a party to the 
[Rome] Statute.”
85
  This view goes further and argues that Sudan’s 
obligations to abide by the Rome Statute are derived from the UN 
Charter and Security Council Resolution 1593.  This is how the tension 




B. The AU’s Response: The Malawi and Chad Decisions  
The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (“AU 
Assembly”) adopted numerous decisions based on the first school of 
thought, where it has argued that by not cooperating with the ICC to 
arrest and surrender President Al Bashir, the AU member states are 
abiding by their obligations under article 98(1) of the Rome Statute.
87
  
Put differently, the AU Assembly argues that article 98(1) requires the 
Rome Statute states parties not to abide by the ICC requests if those 
requests will make them breach their customary international law 
obligations owed to the third state.
88
  The AU then instructed its member 
                                                          
83
  Id. at 329. 
84
  Dapo, supra note 40, at 335. 
85
  Id. at 342. 
86
  Id. 
87
  See, e.g., Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International 
Criminal Court, Assembly of the Union, Seventeenth Ordinary Session, EX.CL/670(XIX), 
Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII) (July 1, 2011) (where the AU Assembly instructed the AU member 
states not to cooperate with the execution of the arrest warrant of Gaddafi and reaffirmed that by 
receiving President Al Bashir, Kenya and Djibouti were discharging their obligations under art 23(2) 
of the AU Constitutive Act and art 98 of the Rome Statute. The AU Assembly is the supreme organ of 
the AU which comprises of Heads of State and government of AU member states, which is the 
founding treaty of the AU)); See Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 6(1) & (2), July 11, 2000, 
2158 U.N.T.S. 3. 
88
  See, e.g., Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor for the 
Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan, Assembly of the Union, Twelfth Ordinary 
Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII) para. 1, (where the AU Assembly expressed “its deep concern” 
of the ICC Prosecutor’s indictment of President Al Bashir. Subsequently, the AU Assembly took a 
common position to instruct the AU member states not to abide by the ICC Requests to arrest and 
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states not to comply with the ICC request to arrest and surrender 
President Al Bashir and relied on the apparent conflict between articles 
27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute.  Indeed, this is the argument that 
has been used by the AU member states to the ICC in their failure to 





 both relied on the “position 
adopted by the [AU] in respect to the international warrant of arrest 
issued by the Prosecutor against [President] Al Bashir,”
91
 and as 
members of the AU they refused to cooperate with the ICC request to 
arrest and surrender him to the ICC.  Malawi explained that since Sudan 
was not party to the Rome Statute, and in accordance with the public 
international principles and its domestic laws, the bar to immunity in 
terms of article 27(2) did not apply to President Al Bashir.
92
  
The Pre-Trial Chamber noted the apparent conflict between article 
27(2) and 98(1), but without any explanation, decided that Malawi and 
Chad (and the AU) were “not entitled to rely on article 98(1) to justify 
refusing to comply with Cooperation Requests.”
93
  The Pre-Trial 
Chamber then gave four reasons why Malawi should have arrested and 
surrendered Al Bashir.
94
  First, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that 
immunities for Heads of States have been rejected by international courts 
since World War I.
95
  Second, an increase in the prosecution of Heads of 
States by courts in the last decade include former presidents Milosevic, 
Charles Taylor, Maummar Gaddafi, and Laurent Bagbo.
96
  Third, 120 
states have ratified the Rome Statute since its inception, meaning these 
                                                                                                                                                                      
surrender President Al Bashir; see Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Assembly of the Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 
Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), para. 10; see also Decision On The International Criminal Court, Assembly 
of the Union, Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session, EX.CL/952(XXVIII), Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI) 
paras. 3-4 (where it commended South Africa ‘for complying with the Decisions of the Assembly on 
non-cooperation with the arrest and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir of The Sudan and [decided] 
that by receiving President Bashir, [South Africa] was implementing various AU Assembly [d]ecisions 
on the warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against President Bashir and that South Africa was 
consistent with its obligations under international law [and reiterated] its decision on the need for all 
Member States to comply with the Assembly [d]ecisions on the warrants of arrest issued by the ICC 
against President Al Bashir of The Sudan pursuant to Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union and Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC’). 
89
 Malawi Decision, supra note 52. 
90
  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the 
Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued 
by the Court with Regard to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 
2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_04203.PDF [hereinafter Chad Decision]. 
91
  Id. para. 7; Malawi Decision, supra note 52 para. 13(ii). 
92
  Malawi Decision, supra note 52 para. 13(i). 
93
  Id. para. 37. 
94
  Id. paras. 38-42. 
95
  Id. 
96
  Id. 
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states have recognized the exceptions to immunities of the states’ top 
officials.
97
  They ratified the Rome Statue knowing full well the 
existence of article 27(2).  The Pre-Trial Chamber also noted that “[e]ven 
some States which have not joined the [ICC] have twice allowed for 
situations to be referred to the [ICC] by United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, undoubtedly in the knowledge that these referrals might 
involve prosecution of Heads of State who might ordinarily have 
immunity from domestic prosecution.”
98
  Finally, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decided that it is inconceivable for Malawi to entrust the ICC with the 
mandate to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes and then 
interpret article 98(1) in a way that would render it impossible for the 
ICC to exercise such a mandate.
99
  Based on these reasons, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber found that there exists an exception to Head of State immunity 
under customary international law, which made article 98(1) of the Rome 
Statute inapplicable.
100
  In a subsequent case, the Chad Decision, 
President Al Bashir had attended an inauguration of the President of 
Chad. The Pre-Trial Chamber applied the same reasoning in the Malawi 
Decision.  In fact, it referred to the Malawi Decision verbatim in 
deciding that Chad was under an obligation to abide by the ICC 
cooperation request and arrest President Al Bashir.
101
  
The Pre-Trial Chamber decisions on Malawi and Chad were 
severely criticized by scholars for failure to deal with the apparent 
conflict between articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute.
102
  First, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber failed to make reference to the two schools of 
thought mentioned above and take a stand.
103
  It was expected that the 
                                                          
97
  Id. 
98
 Id. para. 41. 
99
  Id. 
100
  Id. para. 43. 
101
  See Chad Decision, supra note 90, paras. 12-14. 
102
  See, e.g., Dapo Akande, ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (… At Long Last 
…) But Gets the Law Wrong, BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issues-detailed-decision-on-bashir%E2%80%99s-
immunity-at-long-last-but-gets-the-law-wrong/; William Schabas, Obama, Medvedev and Hu Jintao 
May be Prosecuted by International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber Concludes, PHD STUDIES IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS, (Dec. 15, 2011, 12:21 PM), 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.co.za/2011/12/obama-medvedev-and-hu-jintao-may-be.html; 
Dov Jacobs, A Sad Hommage to Antonio Cassese: The ICC’s Confused Pronouncements on State 
Compliance and Head of State Immunity, SPREADING THE JAM, (Dec. 15, 2011), 
https://dovjacobs.com/2011/12/15/a-sad-hommage-to-antonio-cassese-the-iccs-confused-
pronouncements-on-state-compliance-and-head-of-state-immunity/; Dyani-Mhango, supra note 40; 
Dire Tladi, The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi: On Cooperation, Immunities, and Article 98, 11 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 199 (2013). 
103
  Alexander K.A. Greenwalt, Introductory Note to the International Criminal Court: Decisions 
Pursuant to Articles 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi and the 
Republic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the 
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir & African Union Response, 51 INT’L LEGAL 
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Pre-Trial Chamber would deal with the conflict to bring clarity.  
Secondly, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision rendered article 98(1) 
redundant by deciding that article 27(2) cancelled any customary 
international law immunities that may be owed to a third state—Sudan in 
this case.
104
  In other words, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not make a 
distinction between heads of third states and heads of states parties, which 
article 98 of the Rome Statute intends to do when it comes to immunities.  
Thirdly, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision—that there existed a general 
exception to the Heads of State immunity in prosecutions before 
international courts—is flawed, as this is a misreading of the Arrest 
Warrant Case,
105
 which stated that immunities may be lifted in 
circumstances which include “an incumbent or former Minister for 
Foreign Affairs . . . subject to criminal proceedings before certain 
international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction . . . .”
106
  This 
can be interpreted to mean that international courts or tribunals do not 
have automatic jurisdiction to lift personal immunities to which senior 
state officials are entitled.
107
  This also ties to the fact that there is a legal 
distinction between a Head of State that is party to a treaty and that which 




C. The DRC Decision Finally Resolved the Tension, But Many 
Issues Remain 
In subsequent decisions, the Pre-Trial Chamber addressed the 
tension between articles 27(2) and 98(1) and adopts the second school of 
thought advanced by Akande—that Sudan’s obligations to abide by the 
Rome Statute are derived from the UN Charter and the Security Council 
Resolution 1593.
109
  In fact, these decisions were made by the Pre-Trial 
                                                                                                                                                                      
MAT. 393, 393-4 (2012) (criticising the Pre-Trial Chamber for failing to take into account the two 
approaches). 
104
  Akande, supra note 102. For a contrary view see Tladi supra 102 arguing that since the Pre-
Trial Camber did not undertake any interpretation of article 98(1), there is no basis to argue that the 
PTC rendered it meaningless. 
105
  See also, Akande, supra note 102. 
106
  Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 65, para. 61. 
107
  Akande, supra note 102. 
108
  Gaeta, supra note 57 (correctly arguing that the ICC needs to obtain a waiver of immunity in 
this instance); see also, Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 35 (reiterates that a third state must 
consent to be bound by a treaty in writing). 
109
  See DRC Decision, supra note 60; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-242, Decision 
Following the Prosecutor’s Request for an Order Clarifying that the Republic of South Africa is Under 
an Obligation to Immediately Arrest and Surrender Omar Al Bashir, (June 13, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_06500.PDF; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-267, Decision 
on the Non-Compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar Al-
Bashir to the Court and Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly 
of States Parties to the Rome Statute, (July 11, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04947.PDF; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/02-01/09-266, Decision 
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Chamber II without explaining its departure from the Malawi and Chad 
decisions.
110
  In the DRC Decision,
111
 President Al Bashir visited the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) to attend the COMESA Summit, 
where the DRC claimed that the invitation came from the organisation 
and not from the DRC itself.
112
  The DRC invoked the same defense as 
Malawi and Chad: that the AU had instructed its member states not to 
cooperate with the ICC,
113
 as this would be inconsistent with their 
obligations to respect the immunities attached to President Al Bashir as a 
sitting Head of State.
114
  The DRC also “wondered” about the other states 
parties to the ICC that had failed to comply with the ICC request to 
cooperate (or their obligations to arrest and surrender) and whether this 
was due to the immunities afforded to President Al Bashir as a sitting 
Head of State.
115
  The Pre-Trial Chamber II made it clear that the issue 
was not about other states parties’ motives for failing to comply with the 
ICC’s request to cooperate, as this did not relieve the DRC of its 
obligations under the Rome Statute. The issue was that the DRC, as a 
state party, “failed to execute the 2009 and 2010 Requests issued by the 
[ICC]”
116




The Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the existence of customary 
international law personal immunities for Heads of State—irrespective of 
whether such states are party to the Rome Statute or not.  The Pre-Trial 
Chamber also confirmed that if Heads of State are prosecuted before the 
ICC, article 27(2) of the Rome Statute removes any reliance on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
on the Non-Compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar 
Al-Bashir to the Court and Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the 
Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute, (July 11, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04946.PDF. 
110
  The Darfur Sudan Situation was relocated from Pre-Trial Chamber I to Pre-Trial Chamber II. 
See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-143, Decision on the Constitution of the Pre-Trial 
Chambers and on the Assignment of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Sudan and Cote 
d’Ivoire Situations, (Mar. 3, 2012). Pre-Trial Chambers I and II exercise the same functions in terms of 
arts. 34 and 39 of the Rome Statute. That is why it is interesting to note that Pre-Trial Chamber II’s 
departure from Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Malawi and Chad decisions in the DRC decision is not 
explained. 
111
  DRC Decision, supra note 60. 
112
  Id. para. 12. 
113
  Id. para. 19 (where the DRC made references to the AU Assembly Decision of 2013-10-12 
that “no serving AU Head of State or Government shall be required to appear before any international 
court or tribunal during their term of office”). 
114
  Id. 
115
  Id. para. 20. 
116
  These requests emanate from the arrest warrants issued against President Al Bashir requesting 
states party to the Rome Statute to cooperate by arresting and surrendering President Al Bashir to the 
ICC. See, e.g., Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, supra note 
19 (on the Pre-Trial Chamber’s requests to states to cooperate by arresting and surrendering President 
Al Bashir to the ICC). 
117
  Id 
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customary international law immunities.
118
  The Pre-Trial Chamber II 
acknowledged that the Rome Statute can only bind those states that have 
ratified it and not the third states without their consent, as the rules of 
international law so provide.
119
  Therefore, in the event that the ICC were 
to be faced with the prosecution of a Head of State from a third state, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed that the issue of immunities could be 
raised.  Under these circumstances, article 98(1) of the Rome Statute 
directs the ICC “to secure the cooperation of the third State for the waiver 
or lifting the immunity of its Head of State” and thus “prevent [] the 
requested State from acting inconsistently with its international 
obligations towards the [third state] with respect to the immunities 
attached to the latter’s Head of State.”
120
  This was also confirmed by the 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II in several decisions,
121
 where the Chamber 
“highlight[ed] that only States Parties to the [Rome] Statute are under the 
obligation to cooperate with the Court.”
122
  The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II 
also confirmed that this position may be altered by the Security Council 
by passing a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that 
demands cooperation from non-party states.
123
  Further, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber II acknowledged that except for Sudan,
124
 Resolution 1593 did 
not demand such cooperation as it merely “‘urge[d] all states and 




                                                          
118
  Id. para. 25. 
119
  Id. para. 26. 
120
  Id. para. 27. 
121
  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-420, Decision on the Request of the 
Defense of Abdullah Al-Senussi to Make a Finding of Non-Cooperation by the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania and Refer the Matter to the Security Council, (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_05689.PDF; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-162, 
Decision Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Potential Travel to the United States of America, (Sep. 18, 
2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_06263.PDF [hereinafter USA Decision]; 
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-164, Decision Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Potential Travel 
to the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (Oct. 10, 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_07402.PDF; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-
169, Decision Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Potential Travel to the State of Kuwait, (Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_08951.PDF; and Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-
01/09-199, Decision Regarding the Visit of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir to the Federal Republic of 
Ethiopia, (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_03809.PDF. 
122
  USA Decision, supra note 121, para. 9. 
123
  Id. para. 10. 
124
  See also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-227, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request 
for a Finding of Non-Compliance against the Republic of Sudan paras. 11, 15 (Mar. 9, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_02745.PDF (where the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber noted 
that Sudan has persistently refused to cooperate with the ICC as is does not recognize its jurisdiction. 
However, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that Resolution 1593(2005) binds the Sudanese government 
and that it had failed to abide by its obligations in terms of the UN Charter.). 
125
  USA Decision, supra note 121, para. 11. 
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However, in the DRC Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber II found 
that this case did not fall under those circumstances, where the DRC 
would act inconsistent with its international obligations if it arrested and 
surrendered President Al Bashir.
126
  The Pre-Trial Chamber II’s reasons 
were as follows: Firstly, the Security Council Resolution 1593’s 
instruction to Sudan to “cooperate fully” and to “provide any necessary 
assistance to the Court” eliminated any impediment to arrest and 
surrender, and lifted any immunity Al Bashir might have had.
127
  
Accordingly, the decision by the Security Council in Resolution 1593
128
 
essentially satisfied article 98(1) of the Rome Statute’s requirement for 
the ICC to “first obtain the cooperation of [the] third State for the waiver 
of the immunity.”
129
  The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that an alternative 
interpretation would render the Security Council’s decision requiring 




Secondly, the Pre-Trial Chamber reasoned that the Security 
Council Resolution 1593 “implicitly waived the immunities granted to Al 
Bashir under international law and attached to his position as a head of 
State.  Consequently, there also exists no impediment at the horizontal 
level between the DRC and Sudan as regards the execution of the 2009 
and 2010 requests.”
131
  Thirdly, the Pre-Trial Chamber II stated that the 
UN Charter, from whose provisions the Security Council operates, took 





 of the UN Charter.  Consequently, the AU resolutions could 
not be invoked by the DRC to avoid complying with the ICC obligations, 
as the Security Council implicitly waived Sudan’s immunities.
134
  A 
series of decisions thereafter followed, where the Pre-Trial Chamber used 
the same reasoning to conclude that the Security Council Resolution 1593 
implicitly waived President Al Bashir’s customary international law 
                                                          
126
  DRC Decision, supra note 60, para. 29 
127
  Id. 
128
 S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 10, para. 1-2 ( “2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all 
other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance 
to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party 
to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and 
other international organizations to cooperate fully.”). 
129
 DRC Decision, supra note 60,  para. 24. 
130
  Id. para. 29 
131
  Id. 
132
  U.N. Charter art. 25 (“[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”). 
133
  Id. art. 103 (“[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”). 
134
  DRC Decision, supra note 60, paras. 30, 31. 
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immunities, and consequently there exists no horizontal bar between the 
requested state party and Sudan.
135
  
The Pre-Trial Chamber should be commended for finally 
addressing the conflict between articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome 
Statute and for confirming that article 98(1) precludes the ICC from 
requesting a state to cooperate by arresting and surrendering a Head of 
State of a third state if such cooperation will make the requested state act 
inconsistent with its international obligations towards a third state.  
However, the state party need not recognize a third state leader’s 
immunity if the ICC has requested the third state to lift or waive the 
immunities and the third state agrees to the request.
136
  However, despite 
having dealt with the conflict between articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the 





  Further, I argue that the concerns I raised 
while criticizing the Malawi Decision have not been fully addressed by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber II for the following reasons.
139
  
The DRC Decision endorses the view by Akande that the UN 
Charter and the Security Council Resolution 1593, by implication, make 
Sudan bound by the Rome Statute.
140
  According to this view, there is no 
impediment on state parties to the Rome Statute (such as the DRC) to 
arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to the ICC.  Therefore, in 
refusing to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir, the DRC cannot 
invoke the customary international law obligations it owes to Sudan, a 
non-party state, as per article 98(1).  This view is problematic as it goes 
against the rules of international law that require a state to consent to be 
                                                          
135
  See the decisions listed in footnotes 87 and 88. 
136
  See also Paola Gaeta, Guest Post: The ICC Changes its Mind on the Immunity from Arrest of 
President Al Bashir, But it is Wrong Again, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 23, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/23/guest-post-icc-changes-mind-immunity-arrest-president-al-bashir-
wrong/ (arguing that the Decision “correctly recognizes that Article 98 (1) of the Statute directs the 
Court to secure cooperation of a [third] State . . . for the waiver or lifting of the immunity of its Head 
of State.”). 
137
  Id.; Dire Tladi, The Duty on South Africa to Arrest and Surrender Al Bashir under South 
African and International Law: A Perspective from International Law, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1027 
(2015); Manuel J.  Ventura, Escape from Johannesburg? Sudanese President Al-Bashir Visits South 
Africa, and the Implicit Removal of Head of State Immunity by the UN  Security Council in light of Al 
Jedda, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 995 (2015); André de Hoogh & Abel Knottnerus, ICC Issues New 




  See Nerina Boschiero, The ICC Judicial Finding on Non-cooperation Against the DRC and 
No Immunity for Al-Bashir Based on UNSC Resolution 1593, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 625 (2015); 
Erika de Wet, The Implications of President Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa for International and 
Domestic Law, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1049 (2015). 
139
  Dyani-Mhango, supra note 40. 
140
  Akande, supra note 57, at 335. 
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bound by a treaty.
141
  It is also important to note that while Sudan is 
bound by the UN Charter which gives certain powers to the Security 
Council, including the power to refer a situation to the ICC, such powers 
are limited.   
 To illustrate this point, the Security Council merely refers a 
situation to the ICC for further investigation and for the ICC to decide on 
its own whether or not to prosecute.  Once the Security Council makes 
the referral to the ICC, only the provisions of the Rome Statute will apply 
and not those of the UN Charter.
142
  Article, 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
states that “[t]he [ICC] may exercise its jurisdiction . . . in accordance 
with the provisions of this Statute if: (b) A situation in which one or more 
of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the 
Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the [UN 
Charter].”
143
  This provision does not require the ICC to prosecute 
without following its own process nor does it extend the powers of the 
Security Council to apply extraterritorially (to the ICC).
144
  It is therefore 
expected that the ICC will first satisfy itself that there is a case to be 
heard even if it is a referral from the Security Council.
145
  In support of 
this assertion, article 19 of the Rome Statute requires the ICC to “satisfy 
itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it” and that it may 
on its own motion determine the admissibility of the case.
146
  
                                                          
141
  See Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 34-35. DRC Decision, supra note 60, para. 26 (Apr. 
9, 2014) (also confirmed such – that “the [Rome] Statute cannot impose obligations on third States 
without their consent. Thus, the exception to the exercise of the [ICC]’s jurisdiction provided in article 
27(2) of the Statute should, in principle, be confined to those States Parties who have accepted it.”). 
142
  See Gaeta, supra note 136 (arguing that “the referral of a situation to the Court by the Security 
Council constitutes just one of the conditions for the exercise by the Court of its criminal jurisdiction, 
and does not constitute the source of the jurisdiction of the Court. This applies also when the Security 
Council refers to the Court a situation where the crimes are committed in the territory or by a national 
of a state not party to the Rome Statute.”). 
143
  See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 13(b) (emphasis added). 
144
  See Dyani-Mhango, supra note 40, 118 (arguing that the provision only avails a jurisdictional 
mechanism to the Security Council when dealing with its Chapter VII powers); See also Rome Statute, 
supra note 6, pmbl. (stating that states parties are “[d]etermined to these ends and for the sake of 
present and future generations, to establish an independent permanent [ICC] in relationship with the 
United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.”). 
145
  See generally Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal 
Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity, 7 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 591, 621 (2003) (discussing the admissibility of cases in the ICC where he 
argues that “it is the [ICC] as a judicial body itself that determines conclusively whether or not a case 
is admissible, including all the necessary criteria for determination.”). 
146
  See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 19 (emphasis added); See also, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, 
ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, para. 35 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF (where the Pre-Trial Chamber reiterates that “[a]rticle 19(1) 
of the [Rome] Statute requires the [Pre-Trial] Chamber to satisfy itself that any case brought before it 
falls within the jurisdiction of the [ICC].”). 
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Furthermore, the Rome Statute
147
 does not make a distinction between the 
different mechanisms to trigger jurisdiction mentioned in article 13(b).
148
  
The ICC is not bound to investigate or even prosecute just because the 
Security Council referred a matter to it.
149
  The Rome Statute is clear that 
the investigation lies only with the Prosecutor (and the ICC in general) 
and therefore it is expected of the Prosecutor to make an independent 
decision whether to investigate a situation or not, irrespective of who 
referred the matter to the ICC.
150
  Therefore, while the Security Council 
will be acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter when it refers a 
situation to the ICC, this does not translate into the application of the UN 
Charter provisions to the ICC.  
Secondly, it is hard to fathom that the Security Council can 
implicitly waive sovereign immunities of a UN member state.
151
  One of 
the pillars of the UN is the sovereign equality of its member states
152
 and 
“the rationale underlying waiver of immunity—like the rationale for 
immunity itself—is based on the sovereign equality of states and the 
principle of par in parem non habet imperium.”
153  Only a state may 
                                                          
147
  See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17 (which discusses issues of admissibility in the ICC). 
148
  Id. art. 13 (which in its entirety reads as follows:  
“Exercise of jurisdiction  
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes 
appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 
14; (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; 
or (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 
15.”). 
149
 See Press Release, Security Council, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells Security 
Council Investigation into Darfur Crimes Initiated 1 June, U.N. Press Release SC/8429 (Jun. 29, 2005) 
(commenting on the Al Bashir referral by the Security Council to the ICC, that the Office of the 
Prosecutor “will conduct its own independent investigation in order to determine those persons who 
must be prosecuted.”); See also Gaeta, supra note 136 (arguing that “[t]he obligations set forth by the 
Security Council upon a UN member State with a binding decision under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter cannot affect the rights and powers of another international organization, in this case the ICC, 
as they are regulated in the respective constitutive instrument of such other international 
organization.”). 
150
  Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 15 (especially 15(2) and (3) which state: 
“2. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he 
or she may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental 
or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may 
receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.  
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he 
or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together 
with any supporting material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”). 
151
  Emphasis added. 
152
  UN Charter art. 2, para.1 (stating that ‘[t]he [UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members.”). 
153
  Int’I Law Comm’n, Third Rep. on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/646, para. 32 (2011) [hereinafter ILC Third Report]. For further 
reading on the principle of par in parem non habet imperium see Yoram Dinstein, Par in Parem non 
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waive its own immunities, as the immunity belongs to a state and not the 
individual,
154
 and such a waiver should be explicit.
155
  This reasoning is 
also apparent in the correct interpretation of article 98(1) of the Rome 
Statute which requires the ICC to request the third state to waive its 
immunities.
156
  This is in line with the rule that third states are required to 
expressly consent to be bound by a treaty.
157
  The exception will be only 
when the Security Council passes a binding resolution that explicitly 
removes Sudan’s immunities.
158
  This depends on the context and the 
language used in such a resolution. In this regard, the ICJ has opined that 
[t]he language of the Security Council resolution should be 
carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its 
binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under 
Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact 
exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to 
the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions 
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, 
all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal 
consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.
159
 
Looking at the language of paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
1593 on which the Pre-Trial Chamber II relies, it is evident that the 
resolution does not bind all UN member states, but only Sudan to fully 
cooperate with the ICC.
160
  However, Security Council Resolution 1593 
does not expressly remove the immunities of Sudan.  As explained above, 
immunities relate to state sovereignty and equality of states and it is 
imperative that any waiver or removal of such immunities by the Security 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Habet Imperium, 1 ISR. L. REV. 407 (1966) (arguing that this principle “is commonly regarded as the 
starting point for any venture into the field of State immunities.”).This principle literally means that 
“one state has no power over another”. See id. at 413-4. 
154
 ILC Third Report, supra note 153 para. 33. 
155
 Id. para. 55. 
156
  See also de Hoogh & Knottnerus, supra note 137 (arguing that only the bearer of immunity 
can waive it as also stipulated in article 98(1) of the Rome Statute.); Gaeta, supra note 136 (correctly 
arguing that article 98(1) “is not concerned with whether a [third] State . . . is obliged to cooperate with 
the [ICC].” It requires the [ICC] to first obtain the cooperation of the third state for the waiver and that 
“[t]he decision of the Security Council on the obligation of Sudan to cooperate cannot relieve the Court 
from the necessity to implement a requirement for the correct exercise of a power as it is the case of 
Article 98 (1) of the Rome Statute.”). 
157
  Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 35.  
158
  See de Hoogh & Knottnerus, supra note 137. 
159
  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 
16, para. 114 (June 21). 
160
  S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 10, para. 2 (which states “Decides that the Government of Sudan 
and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary 
assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States 
not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned 
regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully” (emphasis added)). 
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Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter should be in express 
terms.
161
  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Security Council 
Resolution 1593 does not remove Al Bashir’s personal immunities. 
 Further, the constant non-cooperation by states parties to the Rome 
Statute subsequent to the DRC Decision shows that the issue of personal 
immunities is far from settled.  Indeed, the ILC has recently made two 
important observations with regard to the customary international law of 
personal immunities in relation to the Al Bashir matter.
162
  First, the ILC 
reemphasized that “the inapplicability of immunity agreed upon states 
through treaties only applied to states parties.”
163
  It then observed that 
any exception that arose in a vertical relationship with an international 
criminal jurisdiction is not yet evidence of a customary rule in a 
horizontal relationship among states.
164
  Secondly, the ILC observed that 
developments still need to be carefully considered before rejecting the 
impact the practice of international criminal tribunals may have over 
horizontal relationships, depending on the context of each case.
165
  
The Security Council has not yet condemned nor taken any action 
against the non-compliant member states despite numerous reports and 
statements by the ICC President and the Prosecutor.
166
  Article 87(7) of 
the Rome Statute states that “where a party failed to comply with a 
request for cooperation by the [ICC] contrary to the provisions of the 
[Rome] Statute . . . The [ICC] may make a finding to that effect and refer 
the matter . . . to the Security Council.”
167
  The Pre-Trial Chamber has 
eloquently summarized the role of the Security Council on the failure by 
states to cooperate with the ICC as follows: 
When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, refers a situation to the Court as constituting a 
threat to international peace and security, it is expected that 
the Council would spend by way of taking such measures 
which are considered appropriate, if there is an apparent 
                                                          
161
  Ventura, supra note 137, at 1018 (arguing that “if one accepts such a notion [that the Security 
Council can remove a well-established and well recognized norm of international law], and 
considering the wide-ranging powers of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII (including 
authorizing the use of force), then this could potentially open the door to the disturbance or 
displacement of other rules of international law as a result of vague or unclear UN Security Council 
resolutions. And the consequences may not be welcomed or desirable.”). 
162
  ILC Fifth Report, supra note 72. 
163
  Id.  
164
  Id. 
165
  Id.  
166
  Rep. of the Bureau on Non-cooperation, paras. 34–39, ICC-ASP/14/38 (2015) (discussing the 
(in)action by the Security Council to non-cooperating states). 
167
  Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 87(7); see also id. para. 87(5) (covering requests for 
cooperation and non-compliance by third states).  
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failure on the part of the relevant State Party to the Statute to 
cooperate in fulfilling the Court’s mandate entrusted to it by 
the Council. Otherwise, if there is no follow up action on the 
part of the Security Council, any referral by the Council to 
the ICC under Chapter VII would never achieve its ultimate 
goal, which is to put an end to impunity. Accordingly, any 
such referral would become futile.
168
 
It is important that the Security Council clarifies its position on the 
personal immunities of President Al Bashir, as its silence and failure to 
act perpetuates non-cooperation by the UN member states who are also 
states parties to the Rome Statute. 
 Despite the criticisms levelled against the DRC Decision, the 
current law is that states parties to the Rome Statute are obligated to 
arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to the ICC, as the conflict 
between article 27(2) and 98(1) has been resolved by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber II in the DRC Decision and subsequent decisions.
169
  It must be 
recalled that this conflict between these articles arises because a non-
party state will ordinarily not be bound by the Rome Statute.  Article 
27(2), which cancels customary international law immunities, will apply.  
However, because the Security Council referral of a situation occurring 
from a territory of a non-party state, the ICC is expected to request the 
third state to waive its immunities for the states parties to be able to arrest 
and surrender the accused sitting president to the ICC.  The DRC 
Decision, for the reasons advanced above, made it clear that such conflict 
is resolved by the Security Council Resolution 1593.
170
 
IV. SOUTH AFRICA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON IMMUNITIES, AL BASHIR, 
AND THE ICC 
 It must be recalled that President Al Bashir visited South Africa to 
attend the AU summit.  It was expected that South Africa, a state party to 
the Rome Statute, would arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to the 
ICC.  The Southern African Litigation Centre applied to the High Court 
of South Africa to compel South Africa to arrest and surrender President 
Al Bashir to the ICC.  President Al Bashir left South Africa before the 
                                                          
168
  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-151, Decision on the Non-compliance of the 
Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and 
Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, para. 22 (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02245.PDF. 
169
  DRC Decision, supra note 60, para. 29, (where the Pre-Trial Chamber Security Council 
Resolution 1593 (2005), which required Sudan “to cooperate fully with” the ICC, has waived the 
immunities of Sudan and therefore there is no need for the ICC to request for the waiver.). Essentially, 
the conflict between articles 27(2) and 98(1) has been resolved. 
170
  Id. 
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High Court rendered a judgment.  As stated earlier, South Africa has 
enacted three pieces of legislation that address immunities, including the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act 27 of 2002 (“ICC Act”), which has domesticated the Rome Statute.
171
  
This section discusses the proceedings before the South African courts on 
South Africa’s failure to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to the 
ICC, and it also examines South Africa’s legislative framework on 
immunities.  
A.  The Foreign States Immunities Act 
 The first piece of legislation, the Foreign States Immunities Act 
("FSIA”), predates the South African Constitution and the Rome Statute, 
but it is still applicable.
172
  The South African Law Reform Commission 
“consider[ed] that the Foreign States Immunities Act . . . continues to 
serve a purpose to ensure legal certainty on matters related to the extent 
of immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of the South African 
courts and propose[d] that the Act be retained on the statute book.”
173
  
The purpose of the FSIA is “to determine the extent of the immunity of 
foreign states from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith.”
174
  The FSIA defines the term 
“foreign state” to include “the Head of State of that foreign state, in his 
capacity as such Head of State.”
175
  This piece of legislation confers 
immunities to a foreign state from the jurisdiction of the South African 
courts, including criminal jurisdictions.
176
  The FSIA does not require the 
presence of the Head of State before courts when giving effect to the 
immunity conferred by the Act.
177
 
 The FSIA places restrictions on the conferral of immunities on 
several grounds, including when it transpires that the foreign state 
accords less (or more) immunities to South Africa, and if the immunities 
and privileges accorded by the Act “are less than those required by any 
treaty . . .  to which that foreign state and the Republic are parties.”
178
  In 
this regard, the President is required to make a proclamation in the 
Government Gazette, which may restrict or extend such immunities 
                                                          
171
  S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 231(4) (which requires domestication of an international agreement 
before it becomes binding domestically).   
172
  Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 1981 § 18 (S. Afr.). 
173
  S. AFR. L. REFORM COMM’N, PROJECT 25: REPORT ON STATUTORY LAW REVISION: 
LEGISLATION ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
COOPERATION, para. 2.47 (2014). 
174
  Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 1981 pmbl. 
175
  Id. §1 
176
  Id. §§2(1) and (3). 
177
  Id. §2(2). 
178
  Id. §16. 
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depending on the case in question.
179
  The FSIA also recognizes the 
waiver of immunity by a foreign state and confirms that should a foreign 
state expressly waive its immunities, it will then be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of South African courts.
180
  The South African government 
did not rely on any of the provisions of the FSIA in the Southern African 
Litigation Centre case (“SALC”) and the reason is unclear.
181
 
B.  The Diplomatic Immunities Act 
 The second piece of relevant legislation is the Diplomatic 
Immunities Act (“DIA”), whose purpose is “[t]o make provision 
regarding the immunities and privileges of diplomatic missions and 
consular posts and their members, of Heads of State, special envoys and 
certain representatives of the United Nations, and its specialised agencies 
. . . .”
182
  The long title also specifies that these immunities will be 
granted with regard to the international conferences and meetings, among 
other things. The DIA confers customary international law “immunities 
and privileges [to] Heads of State, special envoys and certain 
representatives” from both criminal and civil jurisdiction of the South 
African Courts.
183
  It also requires that the conferment of immunities and 
privileges to the Heads of State be published in the Government Gazette 
by way of a notice.
184
  
 The question before the High Court in the SALC case was whether 
the Cabinet Resolution, read together with a Ministerial Notice, was 
capable of suspending South Africa’s obligation to arrest and surrender 
President Al Bashir.
185
  SALC argued that South Africa is bound by its 
obligations under the Rome Statue as a state party to it.  This meant that 
South Africa had to comply with the ICC’s request to arrest and surrender 
President Al Bashir.  The applicant acknowledged that South Africa 
could only avoid its obligations if President Al Bashir was entitled to 
immunities from the South African courts.
186
 
                                                          
179
  Id. 
180
  Id. §3. 
181
  Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 
(5) SA 1 (GP) at 3 para. 1. 
182
 The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 §4(1)(a) which states that the 
categories of people ‘enjoy [the immunities] in accordance with the rules of customary international 
law’. 
183
  Id. 
184
  Id. § 4(1)(c) read together with §7(2). 
185
  Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 
(5) SA 1 (GP) at 3 para. 1. 
186
  Id. para. 23. 
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 On the other hand, the South African government argued that it 
was merely hosting the event, while the AU Commission was “charged 
with the exclusive responsibility of organizing, conducting and managing 
the meetings and of inviting all the delegates and attendees.”
187
  However, 
as part of the hosting agreement between the South African government 
and the AU Commission, South Africa was expected to grant immunities 
to certain people who would attend the Summit, including members of 
the AU Commission, staff members, delegates and other representatives 
of Inter-Governmental Organizations in terms of the General Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity 
(“OAU Convention”).
188
  This host agreement was concluded in terms of 
section 5(3) of the DIA, which provides that “[a]ny organization 
recognised by the Minister for the purposes of this section and any 
official of such organisation enjoy such privileges and immunities as may 
be provided for in any agreement entered into with such organisation or 
as may be conferred on them by virtue of section 7(2).”
189
  Section 7(2) 
enjoins the Minister to specify the conferment of immunities by notice in 
the Government Gazette. 
 The High Court rejected the government’s argument that the host 
agreement covered President Al Bashir’s immunity, as its provisions only 
conferred immunities to the AU members of staff and to the delegates or 
representatives of intergovernmental organizations.
190
  Further, the Court 
correctly pointed out that the host agreement was included under the 
terms of the DIA, which deals with immunities of members of 
intergovernmental organizations instead of Heads of State.
191
  The Court 
found reliance on such provisions to be “ill-advised and ill-founded.”
192
  
In fact, the Court correctly pointed out that the provision of the DIA that 




                                                          
187
  Id. para. 14. 
188
  Id. para. 15. The General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of 
African Unity, Oct. 25, 1965, CAB/LEG/24.2/13 [hereinafter The OAU Convention] does not refer to 
Heads of State immunity but refers to the immunities granted to the officials, delegates and 
representatives of the OAU. Article V(6) of the OAU Convention defines representatives to ‘include 
all delegates, deputy delegates, advisers, technical experts and secretaries of delegation’. 
189
  Section 5 of The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 is titled ‘Immunities 
and privileges of United Nations, specialised agencies and other international organisations’. 
190
  Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 
(5) SA 1 (GP) at 3 para. 1.28.10.1. 
191
 Id. (The court referred to The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 § 5(3) , 
which provides that ‘[a]ny organization recognised by the Minister for the purposes of this section and 
any official of such organisation enjoy such privileges and immunities as may be provided for in any 
agreement entered into with such organisation or as may be conferred on them by virtue of §7(2)’). 
192
  Id. para. 31. 
193
  Id. para. 28.6. 
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 The Court also held that the discretion of the Minister of 
International Relations and Cooperation could only be exercised within 
the boundaries of South African law and its obligations that arise from 
both national and international law.
194
  The Court further held that the 
AU’s decisions and Convention on Immunities could not trump South 
Africa’s obligations under the ICC Act and the Rome Statute, as their 
provisions “enjoy pre-eminence in our constitutional regime.”
195
   In fact, 
the AU Convention has a persuasive status under South African law as 
South Africa is not a party to it.
196
  The Court held that this fact 
“represent[ed] a clear choice by the legislature not to confer blanket 
immunity on AU bodies, meetings and officials that attend them.”
197
  In 
this regard, the SCA did not find it necessary to alter the High Court’s 
reasoning. It endorsed the High Court’s view that section 5(3) of the 
Diplomatic Immunities Act relied upon by the Minister “did not cover 




C.  The ICC Act  
 The most important piece of legislation relevant to this discussion 
is the ICC Act, which was enacted in order  
[t]o provide for a framework to ensure the effective 
implementation of the Rome Statute of the [ICC] in South 
Africa; to ensure that South Africa conforms with its 
obligations set out in the Statute; to provide for the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; to 
provide for the prosecution in South Africa and beyond the 
borders of South Africa in certain circumstances; to provide 
for the arrest of persons accused of having committed the 
said crimes and their surrender to the said Court in certain 
circumstances; to provide for co-operation by South Africa 




South Africa was the first African state to domesticate the Rome 
Statute.
200
  The Constitutional Court has dealt with the importance of the 
                                                          
194
  Id. para. 28.12. 
195
  Id. para. 28.13.1–3. 
196
  Id. para. 28.13.2–3. 
197
  Id. para. 28.13.2. 
198
  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. Southern African Litigation Centre 
2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA) at para. 41. 
199
  ICC Implementation Act supra note 37. 
200
  Nat’l Commissioner of the South African Police Service v. Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre and Another 2014 (1) SA 30 (CC), at para. 33. 
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ICC Act in South Africa in the National Commissioner of the South 
African Police Service case where it had to determine the extent of South 




 On immunities, the ICC Act provides that “[d]espite any other law 
to the contrary, including customary international law and conventional 
international law, the fact that a person . . . is or was a Head of State or 
government . . . is neither . . . a defence to a crime, nor . . . a ground for a 
possible reduction of sentence once a person has been convicted of a 
crime.”
202
  Some academics have argued that this provision means that 
South African courts should have no impediment in prosecuting and 
convicting accused persons of international crimes irrespective of their 
status.
203
  As to the apparent conflict between the DIA and the ICC Act, 
Professor John Dugard argues that the ICC Act trumps the DIA when it 
comes to international crimes.
204
  Professor Max du Plessis endorses this 
view and argues that by including this provision, “South Africa has 
attempted to cut its way past [the controversy of immunities accorded to 
sitting Heads of State as per the Arrest Warrant Case].” Moreover, du 
Plessis contends that the South African courts “are accorded the same 
power to “‘trump’ the immunities which usually attach to officials of 
government as the ICC by virtue of article 27 of the Rome Statute.”
205
   
 The immunities provision is found in the chapter of the ICC Act 
that deals with the domestic prosecution of the perpetrators of 
international crimes that are found in the Rome Statute.
206
  It misses the 
second part found in article 27 of the Rome Statute which provides 
“[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall 
not bar the [ICC] from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”
207
  
It is unclear why the drafters of the ICC Act decided to leave out this part.  
A view led by Professor Dire Tladi is that the provision does not remove 
immunities, but “it addresses the criminal accountability of an individual, 
that is, the substantive accountability or responsibility, whereas immunity 
is a procedural notion applying to the ‘right of a court to entertain a 
                                                          
201
  Id. paras. 3–4. 
202
  See ICC Implementation Act supra note 37, §4(2) . 
203
  See John Dugard & Garth Abraham, Foreign Policy and International Relations, 2002 ANN. 
SURV. S. AFRICAN L. 140, 165-166 (2002) (arguing that this provision was a choice by the drafters of 
the ICC Act to move away from the Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 65). 
204
  JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 257 (2011). 
205
  Max du Plessis, South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 460, 
474 (2007) . 
206
  See Chapter 2 of the ICC Act titled ‘Jurisdiction of South African Courts and Institution of 
Prosecutions in South African Courts in respect of Crimes’. 
207
 Rome Statute, supra note 6, Art 27(2). 




 In other words, the provision “removes official capacity on a 
substantive defense to the commission of crimes but does not address the 
matter of immunity.”
209
  Tladi’s argument is that a Head of State entitled 
to immunities would not be arrested in the first place since the domestic 
courts would not have had jurisdiction to do so.  This argument was 
raised by the South African government in the SALC case in the SCA, 
where it contended that section 4(2) “has nothing to do with immunity 
from arrest in terms of the ICC arrest warrants, but precludes immunity 
being advanced as a defense or in mitigation of sentences. It does not 




 The SALC on the other hand, argued that the ICC Act’s purpose is 
“to give effect to South Africa’s accession to the Rome Statute and South 
Africa’s obligations [that derive from that].”
211
 The SCA agreed with the 
SALC and reasoned as follows: 
A construction of section 4(2) that would exclude claims of 
immunity if a person was being tried before a South African 
Court, but would not exclude immunity in seeking to bring 
that person to trial before that Court would … be a serious 
anomaly. The ordinary principle of interpretation is that the 
conferral of a power conveys with it all ancillary powers 
necessary to achieve the purpose of that power. The purpose 
of the power to prosecute international crimes in South 
Africa is to ensure that the perpetrators of such crimes do 
not go unpunished. In order to achieve that purpose it is 
necessary for the National Director of Public Prosecutions to 
have the power not only to prosecute perpetrators before our 
Courts, but to bring them before our Courts. This is also 
consistent with the constitutional requirement that the [ICC 
Act] be construed in a way that gives effect to South 
Africa’s international law obligations and the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.
212
     
The SCA should be criticized for not making a distinction between an 
arrest to surrender the head of a third state and an arrest to prosecute a 
                                                          
208
  Tladi, supra note 137, at 1038. But see Ventura, supra note 137, at 1012 fn 65, (arguing that 
‘[i]t makes little sense for the ICC Act to include a defence that no person could ever realistically rely 
upon unless South African courts have jurisdiction over Heads of State in the first place.’) 
209
  Id. 
210
  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. Southern African Litigation Centre 
2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA) at para. 50. This argument was not canvassed before the high court. 
211
  Id. para. 51. 
212
  Id. para. 95 (footnotes omitted). 
June 2017 South Africa’s Dilemma  567 
 
 
Head of State before domestic courts.  The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II has 
confirmed the existence of personal immunities for sitting Heads of State 
and the role article 98(1) of the Rome Statute plays for the purposes of 
arresting and surrendering President Al Bashir to the ICC, and yet it 
failed to make the above distinction.
213
  The SCA itself discussed the 
customary international law immunities in great detail, including the DRC 
Decision, and confirmed that ordinarily President Al Bashir would be 
immune from being arrested and surrendered to the ICC.
214
  Further, the 
SCA has been rightly criticized for concluding that immunities do not bar 
prosecution of Heads of States by South African courts—a position that 
was held by Belgium before the Arrest Warrant Case.
215
  The SCA 
missed the point of immunities in international law—“that the immunity 
from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent [Heads of States] does not mean 
that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have 
committed, irrespective of their gravity.”
216
  Personal immunities are 
temporal in nature and once they cease to exist—when the person ceases 
to hold office or when their state waives the immunities—the person may 
be brought to court to be prosecuted for the heinous international crimes 
they have committed.  
 On the issue of cooperating with the ICC request to arrest and 
surrender (to execute the ICC arrest warrant) the accused to the ICC, the 
ICC Act states that “[t]he fact that the person to be surrendered is a 
person contemplated in section 4(2)(a) or (b) [that is, a sitting or former 
Head of State] does not constitute a ground for refusing to issue an order 
[to surrender].”
217
  Again, the ICC Act does not have a provision similar 
to article 98(1) of the Rome Statute, which precludes the ICC from 
forcing states parties to cooperate if that means such states will breach the 
international obligations owed to a third state.
218
  A possible construction 
of this provision of the ICC Act is that there is no bar to President Al 
                                                          
213
  DRC Decision, supra note 60, at para. 25. 
214
  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. Southern African Litigation Centre 
2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA) at para. 85.  
215
  See Akande, supra note 102 (arguing that this dictum has far reaching effects domestically and 
possibly internationally). 
216
  Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 65, at para 60. 
217
  See ICC Implementation Act supra note 37 ch. 4, Cooperation with and Assistance to Court 
In or Outside South Africa. This chapter includes a part on the procedure for cooperation and surrender 
of the accused to the ICC (§§8-13). The term ‘Court’ is defined in this chapter as the ICC. 
218
  du Plessis, supra note 205, at 476-477, however has argued that ‘if one accepts that under 
international law personal immunity attaches to incumbent senior cabinet officials such as Heads of 
State, then not only would any prosecution by South Africa under the ICC Act of a current leader of a 
country that is not party to the ICC Statute be possibly inconsistent with its (South Africa’s) 
obligations under customary international law, but the ICC would also be prevented from requesting 
the surrender of that person. This may in fact mean that proceedings against such a person are 
effectively precluded. The only exception to this situation would be a waiver of the immunity by the 
third state.’ (Footnotes omitted). 
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Bashir’s surrender to the ICC.
219
  The SCA rejected the government’s 
argument that this provision is catered for a person who was already 
arrested in terms of section 8 of the ICC Act (dealing with the procedure 
for the arrest) on the grounds that such construction will render section 
10(9) of the ICC Act (dealing with no ground for refusal)
220
 useless as 
this means that no Head of State will ever come before courts for the 
purposes of section 10(9).
221
  The problem with this interpretation is that 
the SCA, like the DRC Decision, does not make a legal distinction 
between a Head of State that is a party to the Rome Statute and a head of 
a third state.  While I agree that the section will be made redundant by 
claiming that all Heads of State may not be arrested and surrendered, it is 
reasonable to argue that the Head of State from a third state is precluded 
from being arrested and surrendered without a waiver as the Rome 
Statute so requires.  In fact, the SCA has also conceded that there are 
customary international law immunities afforded to sitting Heads of State 
not party to the Rome Statute.
222
 
D. South Africa’s Withdrawal from the Rome Statute 
 From the discussion, and despite the criticism of the SCA judgment 
above, the ICC Act takes precedence when it comes to arresting and 
surrendering accused persons to the ICC.  There was no legal impediment 
on the part of South Africa to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir 
since section 232 of the Constitution also states that customary 
international law is applicable in so far as it does not conflict with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.
223
  This means that the current law 
expected the South African government to adhere to the High Court 
Order and arrest President Al Bashir to surrender him to the ICC.  This 
has also been confirmed by the sudden attempt to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute by the South African government
224
 in terms of article 127 
                                                          
219
  See also, du Plessis, supra note 205, at 476 arguing that ‘where South Africa chooses to 
surrender a high standing official to the ICC, the ICC Act makes clear that whatever immunity might 
have otherwise attached to the official does not constitute a bar to the surrender of the person to the 
ICC’; and Ventura, supra note 137, at 1010, also arguing that ‘there is no reasonable way to read the 
ICC Act’s provisions on surrender and participation with the ICC even when a Head of State is 
involved in a way … that [says] that South Africa should not surrender President Al-Bashir or 
cooperate with the ICC with respect to his case’. 
220
  ICC Implementation Act supra note 37 §10(9) stipulates that ‘[t]he fact that the person to be 
surrendered is a person contemplated in §4(2)(a) or (b) does not constitute a ground for refusing to 
issue an order contemplated in subsection (5)’. 
221
  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. Southern African Litigation Centre 
2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA) at para. 101.  
222
  Id. para. 85. 
223
  See also, Id. para. 62. 
224
  The Notice of Withdrawal was deposited with the UN Secretary-General on 2016-10-19. See 
South Africa formally withdrawing from ICC, SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT NEWS AGENCY, (Oct. 
21, 2016), http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-formally-withdrawing-icc; see also UN confirms 
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of the Rome Statute.
225
  To support its position to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute, the South African government has argued that the Rome 
Statute conflicts with the Immunities Act with regard to the personal 
immunities of the sitting Heads of State, which are recognized under 
customary international law.
226
  This argument has been expanded in the 
Repeal Bill (the Bill repealing the ICC Act) as follows: 
[T]he Republic of South Africa, in exercising its international 
relations with Heads of State of foreign countries, 
particularly Heads of State of foreign countries in which 
serious conflicts occur or have occurred, is hindered by the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act, 2002, which together with the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court compel South 
Africa to arrest Heads of State of foreign countries wanted by 
the International Criminal Court for the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes and to surrender 
such persons to the International Criminal Court, even under 
circumstances where the Republic of South Africa is actively 




The South African government has since decided to halt its intention to 
exit the ICC by withdrawing the Repeal Bill from Parliament. Thus, 
South Africa remains a state party to the Rome Statute and therefore  
South Africa is still obligated to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir 
should he return to the territory.
228
  Further, South Africa still has to face 
the consequences of failure to cooperate with the ICC when it did not 
arrest and surrender President Al Bashir.
229
  It is likely that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber II will apply the DRC Decision to the South African situation 
once it deals with the matter, including reporting South Africa to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
SA ICC withdrawal, MSN NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), http://www.msn.com/en-za/news/featured/un-
confirms-sa-icc-withdrawal/ar-AAjfDDh?li=AA520r. 
225
  Rome Statute, supra note 6, Article 127(1) states that ‘A State Party may, by written 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute’. 
226
  Press Conference Statement from Michael Masutha, Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services, ENCA NEWS (Oct. 20, 2016). 
227
  See Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill, 
B23 of 2016, pmbl. 
228
  Rome Statute, supra note 6, 127(2). 
229
  South Africa has asked the ICC to delay its findings until South Africa exhausts its internal 
appeals of the Al Bashir matter. However, Minister Masutha, on his press statement announced that the 
Constitutional Court appeal, supra note 226, will be withdrawn. On April 7, 2017, the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber II heard the arguments from the ICC Prosecutor and the South African government legal 
representatives, see The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-T-2-ENG, 
Transcript (Apr. 7, 2017),  https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2017_02211.PDF. The decision has 
not yet been handed down.   
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Security Council as it has done in relation to other states parties.
230
  
Therefore, South Africa still has to face the consequences resulting from 
its failure to cooperate with the ICC. 
V. CONCLUSION 
  President Al Bashir has avoided the ICC for seven years and has 
been able to travel to both states parties to the Rome Statute and non-
states parties’ territories without any consequences.  The existence of 
customary international law immunities makes it difficult for the ICC to 
discharge its duties without the cooperation by states parties.  The silence 
by the Security Council and its failure to clarify Security Council 
Resolution 1593 on whether it removes Sudan’s immunities equally 
makes the ICC’s job difficult.  
There is still a need to clarify the role of personal immunities 
derived from customary international law, especially considering the 
vertical relationships between international criminal jurisdictions and the 
potential impact on horizontal relations among states.  The ILC is dealing 
with this issue and it is hoped that this will settle the matter.  The current 
position of the ILC is that there exists no customary rule that is an 
exception to the existence of customary international law recognizing 
personal immunities of sitting Heads of States, although a treaty may alter 
this position. 
 I argued previously, that the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Malawi 
Decision failed to attend to the apparent conflict between articles 27(2) 
and 98(1) of the Rome Statute.
231
  I also argued that Malawi was justified 
in not arresting and surrendering President Al Bashir to the ICC because 
of the customary international law obligations it owed to Sudan, a non-
party state to the Rome Statute.  However, the above arguments I used 
against the Malawi Decision are not applicable to the South African 
situation based on the following reasons.  First, the South African 
Constitution limited the application of customary international law by 
making it subordinate to the Constitution and legislation should there be a 
conflict.  Secondly, South Africa domesticated the Rome Statute and 
made it superior to any other law to the contrary.  The ICC Act not only 
disregarded personal immunities of sitting Heads of State as per article 
                                                          
230
  See, e.g, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/02-01/09-266, Decision on the Non-Compliance by 
the Republic of Djibouti with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and 
Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to 
the Rome Statute (July 11, 2016). 
231
  Dyani-Mhango, supra note 40. 
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27(2) of the Rome Statute, but it ensured that customary international law 
is not applicable.  
The commentators are still not convinced that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is correct in deciding that the conflict between articles 27(2) 
and 98(1) of the Rome Statute is resolved by the Security Council 
Resolution 1593 waiving Sudanese immunities.  The continuous non-
cooperation by states parties to the Rome Statute by failing to arrest and 
surrender President Al Bashir also shows that this issue is far from over.  
However, no state party has yet appealed the Pre-Trial Chamber to the 
Appeals Chamber.  We will wait to see if the South African hearing 
before the ICC on failure to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to 
the ICC will produce different results.
232
 
   
  
                                                          
232
  The Pre-Trial Chamber heard the arguments by the government of South Africa and the ICC 
Prosecutor on April 7, 2017. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-274, Decision Convening a 
Public Hearing for the Purposes of a Determination under Article 87(7) of the Statute with regard to 
the Republic of South Africa (Dec. 8, 2016). 
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